Abstract-Polar codes have been proven to be capacity achieving for any binary-input discrete memoryless channel, while at the same time they can reassure secure and reliable transmission over the single-input single-output wireless channel. However, the use of polar codes to secure multiple-antenna transmission and reception has not yet been reported in the open literature. In this paper, we assume a multiple-input multiple-output wiretap channel, where the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper are equipped with the same number of antennas. We introduce a protocol that exploits the properties of both physical and media access control layer security by employing polar coding and encryption techniques in a hybrid manner in order to guarantee secure transmission. A novel security technique is also proposed, where a cryptographic key is generated based on the information transmitted and renewed every transmission block without the need for a separate key exchange method. Finally, to illustrate the effectiveness of the proposed protocol, we prove the weak and strong security conditions, and we provide a practical method to achieve computational security for the cases where these conditions cannot be established.
I. INTRODUCTION
Security in wireless communication systems has become more and more important in recent years due to the wide range of the developing radio services and emerging applications that require privacy, reliability and high spectral efficiency. The majority of the commonly used security methods are based on cryptographic techniques employed at the upper layers of a wireless network; however, physical (PHY) layer security has recently attracted considerable attention, since it exploits the wireless medium propagation properties in order to provide secure communication [1] . To this end, several methods to enhance security at the PHY layer in wireless networks have been proposed so far [2] - [5] .
Achieving secrecy in the PHY layer of multiple-antenna wiretap channels can be achieved by several means, via the exploitation of multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) degrees of freedom (see, for instance, [6] and references therein). As such, secrecy precoding and transmit antenna selection Manuscript received ###. The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript was ###.
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Digital Object Identifier 10.1109/TCOMM.2015.### schemes have already been proposed to enhance the signal quality at the destination and limit the signal strength at the eavesdropper, keeping at the same time the multiplexing and diversity benefits of MIMO systems [6] - [9] . More recently, the issue of increasing the PHY-layer security has also been examined in massive or large-scale MIMO systems [10] , [11] .
Polar codes, a class of provably capacity-achieving codes [12] , have also been used in the past as a means to achieve secure wireless transmission, just to mention [13] - [18] . Particularly, in [13] , a nested structure of polar codes was introduced for the degraded wiretap channel, and the weak secrecy condition was proved. In [14] , polar code constructions for single-input single-output (SISO) binary-input symmetric wiretap channels have been proposed, and the notions of both weak and strong security were tackled by appropriate security coding schemes. The design of low complexity polar coding schemes for secure transmission, through the bidirectional broadcast channel with common and confidential messages, was investigated in [15] . Furthermore, a new secure information transmission scheme based on polar codes with a pre-shared secret key was proposed in [16] . Low-complexity secret-key capacity achieving schemes based on polar codes for some classes of source models were proposed in [17] . Finally, by applying universal polar coding and polar coding for asymmetric channels, the authors in [18] proposed a novel coding scheme that can achieve the secrecy capacity of the general wiretap channel.
In the context of multiple-antenna systems, channel polarization was recently discussed in [19] - [21] . Three schemes for MIMO channel polarization have been presented in [19] , where polar codes were designed for achieving a lower frame error rate. A space-time polar coded modulation scheme based on a generalized channel polarization method, which requires joint optimization of the binary polar coding, modulation and MIMO transmission, was proposed in [20] . Similarly, the error performance of a concatenated space-time block coding scheme with polar coding under different code lengths was investigated in [21] . However, none of these works consider multiple antennas at either side of the communication system. To the best of our knowledge, the only work dealing with secure transmission in multiple-antenna systems with the aid of polar codes is [22] , which proposes a scheme that can provide both reliable and secure communication over the multiple-input single-output single-eavesdropper (MISOSE) fading channel.
A. Contribution
In the present work, motivated by the secure polar coding schemes proposed in [13] and [14] , we propose a secure coding and transmission scheme that can be applied to MIMO wireless communication systems, and guarantees privacy and reliability. The proposed transmission protocol employs both PHY-layer and cryptographic techniques, while at the same time exploits the assets of both polar codes and MIMO systems. To the best of the authors' knowledge, this is the first time a secure polar coding scheme for wireless MIMO systems has been presented in the open technical literature. Moreover, to prove the validity of the proposed method, we prove the weak and strong information theoretic secrecy conditions. Last but not least, we propose a novel receiver architecture, where coding is used in order to perform transmit antenna selection.
B. Organization and Notations
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. A brief overview of the concept of polar codes is given in Section II. The system and channel model, as well as the proposed weak and strong security coding schemes, are described in Section III. In Section IV, we first prove the reliability and strong security conditions for the weak coding scheme in an auxiliary multiple-input single-output (MISO) system, where the transmitter (TX) and the receivers (RXs), both the legitimate and the eavesdropper, are equipped with two and one antenna, respectively, and one receiver. Afterwards in Section IV-D, the analysis is extended to practical systems with any number of transmit, legitimate receive and nonlegitimate receive antennas. In Section V, the reliability and strong security conditions are proven for the strong coding scheme. Aspects about the practical security levels of the proposed system and the advantages of using the proposed coding scheme compared to a single-antenna scheme are detailed in Section VI. Finally, conclusions are drawn in Section VII.
Notations: In Table I we present the notations and the symbols that will be used throughout the remainder of the paper.
Also, unless otherwise stated, bold upper-case letters denote matrices, while bold lower-case letters represent vectors. Also, calligraphy denotes sets. As it is commonly used in the literature, the names Alice, Bob and Eve are used to refer to the legitimate TX, legitimate RX and eavesdropper, respectively.
II. POLAR CODES FOR SECURITY
In this section, we first present some information regarding the principles behind polar coding, as well as the encoding and decoding process in Section II-A. Afterwards, in Section II-B, we present the reliability condition and the weak and strong security conditions, which will be used in order to prove the security of the proposed method. In Section II-C we define the specific polar coding schemes that will be used in the following sections.
A. Fundamentals of Polar Coding
Let W be a binary-input discrete memoryless channel (B-DMC) with a binary input alphabet X = {0, 1} and an arbitrary output alphabet Y. For this channel, the Bhattacharyya The probability that a probabilistic event E will occur. P X n (·)
Output of a polar encoder of type X and codeword length n (see Section II-C). W (s 2 |s 1 ) The probability that the channel will output s 2 given the input s 1 . X n A set of bits with length n. x
The average value of x.
parameter, which is an upper bound on the probability of maximum-likelihood (ML) decision error for a single use of W, can be defined as [12] 
Channel polarization occurs when n independent copies of a B-DMC W are combined to form a second set of n channels {W
} such that, for any given δ as n → ∞, where n is a power of two, the fraction of indices i ∈ {1, · · · , N } with Z(W (i) n ) ∈ [0, δ) tends to the symmetric channel capacity C(W ). These channels are considered "good", while those with Z(W
are considered "bad". This phenomenon, called polarization, is used in the construction of polar codes, in the sense that only the good channels can be used for the transmission [12] .
In order to encode an information vector u into a codeword y of length n, the bits of u are placed in the position of the good bit-channels, and the frozen bits, whose values are known to both the TX and the RX, are placed in the position of the bad bit-channels. Arikan stated in [12] that the selection of the frozen bits does not affect the performance of the code, consequently we can simply select to fill their positions with zeros. The codeword y reads
where P n (u, W ) denotes the encoding process of u with a code of length n prior to the transmission through W , as described in [12] . In the following, we adopt the notation of [14] to denote the good and bad channels. Specifically, for an arbitrary fixed positive constant β < 1/2, the set of the good bit-channels is given by
An important property of polar codes is degradation [23] ; according to which, when designing a polar code for channels W and W ′ , where W ′ is degraded with respect to W , i.e.,
namely the set of good bit-channels of W ′ is a subset of the set of good bit-channels of W .
B. Reliability and Security Conditions
Our goal is to design a polar coding scheme that transmits information both reliably and securely. This can be guaranteed if certain conditions are satisfied, namely the reliability condition, and the weak and strong security conditions. In this section, we shortly present these theoretical conditions as defined in [24] , [25] .
Reliability Condition: The reliability condition guarantees that the legitimate RX will be able to recover the original message with an error probability that tends to zero as the block length tends to infinity. It is defined below as
where P r {·} is the block error probability,û stands for the legitimate receiver's estimation of the information block u, and k is the length of the block, i.e., k = |u|. Weak Security Condition: Concerning the security of the coding scheme, this is measured in information theoretic terms and is independent of the eavesdropper's computational ability. Specifically, the weak security condition is given by
where Z denotes the eavesdropper's observation of the coded block. According to (6) , the ratio of the mutual information I(u; Z) to the length k will tend to zero for infinite block lengths, which means that the ratio of the information that the eavesdropper could be able to recover to the total block length tends to zero as the block length tends to infinity. Strong Security Condition: Maurer [25] argued that in many cases the weak security condition is not adequate, thus he proposed the strong security condition, which can be expressed as
This expression indicates that, as the block length tends to infinity, the amount of information from the original message that could be extracted by the eavesdropper tends to zero. 
C. Description of the Underlying Polar Coding Schemes for SISO channels
Next, we define three types of polar encoding, namely Type A, Type B, and Type C, which will be used in the design of the proposed multiple-antenna polar coding schemes. Notice that these schemes refer to wireless communication systems, in which the TX and each one of the RXs are equipped with one antenna, namely single-input single-output single-eavesdropper (SISOSE), however they will be applied accordingly to multiple-input multiple-output multiple-eavesdropper (MIMOME) systems by employing the proposed method described in Section III-B. Their block structure, described in Fig. 1 , is tailored to the traditional wiretap channel introduced by Wyner in [26] , where Alice wishes to send confidential messages to Bob in secret from Eve. For Type A and Type C, the Alice-Eve eavesdropper channel W ′ needs to be degraded with respect to the legitimate Alice-Bob channel W , whereas for all types of polar encoding, the length of the encoded blocks is n. Next, we demonstrate and discuss the structure of the Type A, B and C blocks.
Type A: The set of good bits transmitted through W is G n (W, β), and the corresponding set of good bits for W ′ is G n (W ′ , β). Based on (4), we know that the degradation property is valid, and therefore the length of the information block u to be encoded will be
In this case, as illustrated in Fig. 1(a) , we split the bit channels into three parts: 1) In the positions indicated by the set G n (W ′ , β), we place random uniformly distributed bits, since these are the bits that can be retrieved by Eve. 2) In the positions indicated by the set
, we place the bits of the information vector u, since these are the bits that can be retrieved by Bob, but not by Eve. 3) In the positions indicated by the set Z n−1 0 \G n (W, β) we place the frozen bits, which are selected to be 0 without loss of generality. As stated in [12] , the value of the frozen bits does not affect the performance of the code in any way. If y A is the encoded block, then the encoding process returns
It has been proved in [14] that, this coding scheme satisfies the weak security condition displayed in (6) . This type of coding is essentially the weak security coding scheme proposed in [14] , so the reader can refer to this work for further information. Type B: In this type of coding, the information vector u to be encoded has length
A cryptographic key K is used to encrypt the information block u by using a symmetric-key encryption algorithm. The particular encryption schemes that are used are presented in Section IV-C. The encryption algorithm is such that the length of the encrypted block is equal to the length of the information vector, i.e.,
where {u} K denotes the encrypted block. As illustrated in Fig. 1(b) , we split the bit channels into two parts: 1) In the positions indicated by the set G n (W, β), we place the encrypted block {u} K . 2) In the positions indicated by the set Z n−1 0 \G n (W, β) we place the frozen bits, which are selected to be 0 without loss of generality. If y B is the encoded block, then the encoding process is denoted as
Note that the eavesdropper's channel is not taken into consideration in this expression. The reason will become clear in Sections IV and V. Type C: In this case, we retain the split of the bit channels into good and bad for Bob, but a more strict criterion for badness from Eve's point of view is introduced. Specifically, a δ n < 1 is defined, such that the bit channels
can be considered poor for Eve. If u is the information block to be encoded, its length will be
In this case, we split the bit channels into the following three parts: 1) In the positions indicated by the set Z n−1 0 2) In the positions indicated by the set
we place the bits of the information vector u.
3) In the positions indicated by the set P n (W ′ , δ n ) \ G n (W, β) we place the frozen bits, which are selected to be 0. If y C is the encoded block, then the encoding process reads
This kind of coding was introduced in [14] as a strong security coding scheme, where it has been proven to satisfy the strong security condition displayed in (7), so the reader can refer to it for more information.
III. SYSTEM MODEL AND TRANSMISSION SCHEME

A. MIMO Channel Signal Model
We consider an open-loop linear spatial multiplexing (SM) MIMO wiretap channel, as illustrated in Fig. 2 , where the TX Alice, the RX Bob, and the eavesdropper Eve are equipped with N s antennas each. In this MIMO wiretap channel, we assume that Alice has full short-term (instantaneous) channel state information (CSI). Alice encodes her messages and transmits the resulting codewords to Bob via H AB baseband equivalent MIMO wireless channel
where h AB ij is the channel coefficient between the jth TX antenna and the ith RX antenna. Due to the broadcasting nature of wireless channels, Eve overhears the information conveyed from Alice to Bob without inducing any interference to the main channel [27] - [29] , via H AE MIMO wireless channel where h AE ij is the channel coefficient between the jth TX antenna and the ith eavesdropper's antenna. We assume that both the main channel and the eavesdropper's channel experience slow block fading, where the fading coefficients are invariant during one fading block (or equivalently, the coherence time of the channel) 1 . Additionally, it is considered that the block length L s is long enough to allow for capacity-achieving coding within each block [29] . The main channel and the eavesdropper's channel are assumed to have the same fading block length.
As illustrated in Fig. 3 , Alice encodes the information message using the algorithm proposed in Section IV-D. The encoder gives N s output data streams, which are modulated to N s transmission blocks, and an antenna mapper index vector that indicates the antennas from which type A, B or C data blocks will be transmitted. Let
be the input to the antenna mapper symbol stream at the k time interval, then the transmitted signal at a given time interval m can be expressed as
where P is a generalized permutation matrix of order N s with exactly one 1 in each row and each column and zeros elsewhere [30] . The baseband equivalent received signal by X RX, where X can be B or E to denote Bob or Eve, respectively, is given by
where n X denotes the additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN). As demonstrated in Fig. 4 , the baseband equivalent received signal passes through an equalizer. For simplicity, we consider a zero forcing (ZF) equalizer, which nullifies the interfering terms as its output. The ZF linear equalizer matrix is given by
and the signal at the output of the equalizer can be expressed as
where
Note that the equivalent signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) of y X ,i is given by
with u AX i be a (0, 1)-vector with exactly one 1. Note that the capacity C is connected to the SNR γ via a monotone strictly increasing function, therefore when γ
then for the corresponding channel capacities C i > C j [31] .
The equalized baseband signal passes through the antenna demapper, which rearranges the symbols as
or equivalentlys
which is forwarded to the detector, and their output is stored to L-length buffers. Note that P T X models an antenna demapper that is used to re-arrange the received signal. Furthermore, since P X is a permutation matrix, P −1
If the constellation order that is used for modulation is M and the length of the bit block is L, then this process is repeated L s = L log 2 M times (using L s time intervals) until the buffers are full. Then, the estimated codewords stored in the buffers are forwarded to the decoder.
In the next section, we will present the proposed hybrid polar coding scheme. Note that h is used to denote the fading channels, while W is used to denote the bit channels from the output of the encoder, as shown in Fig. 3 , to the input of the decoder, as shown in Fig. 4 .
B. The Hybrid Polar Coding Scheme
We assume a bit block V A of length L, which is the information block that will be transmitted to Bob. A = Z L−1 0 is the set of indices of the bits in V A . As in Section III-A, N s is the number of channels that will be used to transmit the information in V A . The set A is partitioned into N s independent and not necessarily identical subsets A i , i ∈ Z Ns−1 0 , where A i stands for the ith set, such that
Similarly, with V Ai we will denote the bit vector that corresponds to the set of indices A i . Based on the system model described in the previous section, the information subblocks A i are to be transmitted separately via the N s antennas. The size of the subsets {A 1 , A 2 , · · · , A Ns } will be determined in Sections IV and V, where the polar coding schemes are presented. A simplified architecture of Alice's TX for the implementation of the proposed scheme is shown in Fig. 5 , where we can see the different coding types that can be employed.
In the proposed method, as mentioned above, Alice uses N s antennas for the transmission of information. One antenna with index i main is selected as the main antenna. The antenna selection process will be outlined in the following sections. We transmit the information block V A0 through the main antenna, after encoding it with a Type A code if we want to use the weak security coding scheme, or Type C if we want to use the strong security coding scheme.
Each of the information blocks V Ai , i ∈ 1, · · · , N s − 1 is transmitted through the rest of Alice's antennas that are used for transmission with a Type B code, which, as stated in Section II-C, Type B coding requires a cryptographic key. The key used for each channel is V A0 , indicating that the information transmitted by the main channel is used as a cryptographic key for Type B blocks transmitted through the rest of the channels. This is useful, since there isn't a need for a separate key exchange process, but it is performed simultaneously with information transmission.
IV. WEAK SECURITY CODING SCHEME In this section, we describe the proposed coding scheme that satisfies the weak security condition defined in Section II-B. First, we assume an auxiliary MISO system in which Alice is equipped with two antennas with indices j ∈ {0, 1}, while Bob and Eve are equipped with one antenna each. Furthermore, we assume that there is no interference in the channels formed between the two individual antennas. Note that this is a purely theoretical auxiliary scenario that doesn't apply in practice, since we cannot realistically consider that there is no interference. However, the result provides the theoretical framework, which we will use to prove the security and reliability conditions for the MIMO system described in Section III, which is a practical and realistic scenario that can be applied to a real world setting. The Alice-Bob wireless communication link is established through two channels, which are denoted by W 0 and W 1 , while Alice and Eve communicate via the channels W For the antenna i = 0, we consider that the Alice-Eve equivalent channel described by (24) is degraded compared to the Alice-Bob channel, and Type A coding, P A n (V A0 , W 0 , W ′ 0 ), is used. According to [14, Th. 8] ,
We make no assumptions about the capacity of the Alice-Eve channel for the antenna i = 1.
A. Proof of the Reliability Condition
In this section, we prove that the proposed polar coding scheme satisfies the reliability condition, which can be proven for both Alice's antennas. First, we examine the antenna j = 0, for which Type A is used.
Main Antenna: As described in Section II-C, in Type A coding, the set of good bit channels G n (W 0 , β) is used to transmit an information vector V ′ A0 , that is formed as
where V A0 denotes the information vector and V R represents the random bit vector defined in Section II-C. As it was proven in [32] , for any fixed positive constant β < 1 2 , the decoding error probability at the destination satisfies
where n is the codeword length. From (31), because k 0 ≤ n, it follows that
can be recovered with an error probability that tends to zero, it is also valid for V A0 as we observe from (30) . Thus the reliability condition is proven for the channel j = 0.
Secondary antenna: Next, we consider the channel with j = 1, where Type B coding is used. In this case, the set of good bit channels G n (W 1 , β) is used to transmit the encrypted vector V ′ A1 , that is formed as
Similarly to (31) and (32), the error probability at the destination can be bounded as
and, because p(
where defined in (30), should be known to Bob. As it was stated in Section IV, the channels W 0 and W 1 are independent and the received signal does not interfere to each other. Therefore,
Furthermore, according to (32) , (35) and (36), it follows that
and the reliability condition is proven for the channel j = 1.
B. Proof of the Weak Security Condition
As mentioned in Section IV, we use a Type A code, for which the weak security condition is proven for the channel j = 0 by [14] . In this section, we prove the weak security condition for the channel j = 1, which uses a Type B code.
Proposition 1. In the auxiliary MISO system, in which the TX is equipped with 2 antennas, Type A coding is employed for
the channel j = 0, and Type B coding is used for the channel j = 1. Additionally, we assume equal length between message V A1 and key V A0 , and the encryption method employed in the channel j = 1 is a one-time pad. The weak security condition is valid for this channel, i.e.,
where Z denotes Eve's observations and k denotes the length of the information block.
Proof: In this proof, the symbols V A0 , V A1 and Z denote the sets of possible values that V A0 , V A1 and Z can take, respectively. We assume that the length of the key V A0 is equal to the length of the message V A1 , |V A0 | = |V A1 | and that the encryption method used for channel j = 1 is the onetime pad, which can be modelled as a bitwise XOR [31] . The mutual information between the key and Eve's observations can be expressed as [33] 
Since the ciphertext is known to Alice, there is a one-to-one correspondence g between the keys and the message, such that
Therefore, the event V A0 = v 0 happens if and only if the event V A1 = g(v 0 ) happens. This yields
and
As v 0 ranges over V A0 , g(v 0 ) ranges over V A1 , and as a result
Since the weak security condition is valid for the channel i = 0, the weak security condition for the channel i = 1 can be straightforwardly proven using (43), as
which concludes the proof. It should be noted that this can be extended to the case where |V A0 | ≥ |V A1 |, if V A0 is truncated to the length |V A1 |. In the case where |V A0 | < |V A1 |, meaning that the key is shorter than the message, we can use a different symmetric key encryption scheme, but in this case the security achieved for the channel with j = 1 will be computational as it will be described in Section IV-C, since there cannot be a bijective correspondence between the keys and the message.
C. The Encryption Method
To make some insightful observations about the encryption method employed in the Type B coding scheme, we consider again the 2 × 1 auxiliary MISO wireless communication system, presented in Section IV. In this case, if the length of the cryptographic key V A0 is greater than the length of the message V A1 , i.e., |V A0 | ≥ |V A1 |, then the one-time pad method can be used, and has been proven in [31] that with this method it is impossible to recover the information V A1 without prior knowledge of the cryptographic key, and there is a bijective relation between knowledge of the key (or part of it) and the encrypted information.
On the other hand, if |V A0 | < |V A1 |, then we have to use a different encryption method. The selected method should be able to produce a cryptographic key of any given length based on an input seed. Specifically, we recommend the following procedure. First, we use a cryptographically secure pseudorandom number generator (CSPRNG), such as the Blum-Blum-Shub generator [34] , where the key V A0 is used as a seed in order to produce a pseudorandom sequence X of length equal to |V A1 |. Note that the exact seed needs to be known at Bob's side in order to reverse the output of the CSPRNG.
Then, we perform a bitwise XOR between X and V A1 , and finally the information block that will be encoded with a Type B polar code will be
The security level offered by this method will be dependent on the security provided by the CSPRNG. For example, in the case of the Blum-Blum-Shub generator, reversing the pseudorandom sequence would require solving the quadratic residuosity problem, which is known as NP-complete, which provides computational security. The reader can refer to [34] for more information regarding this problem.
D. MIMO Transmission Strategy
In this section, we use the analytical framework established in the previous section to formulate the proposed transmission protocol. We assume that Alice, Bob and Eve are equipped with N s antennas each that are used to transmit and receive information. As it was shown in Section III, the system setup is such that we can consider that there are N s Alice-Bob channels and N s Alice-Eve channels with no interference between them. Specifically, each of Alice's antennas is mapped to one of Bob's antennas, so that each of Alice's antennas corresponds to one of Bob's antennas, so there is a one-byone correspondence between Alice's and Bob's antennas. The same is true for the Alice-Eve channels.
The jth Alice-Bob channel is denoted by W ABj , j ∈ Z Ns−1 0 , whereas W AEj , j ∈ Z Ns−1 0 stands for the jth AliceEve channel. In both these cases, the j index refers to Alice's jth antenna, therefore two channels with the same index W ABj and W AEj begin from the same antenna on Alice's side. We assume that the jth antenna transmits the block of information V Aj through the channel W ABj , j ∈ Z N −1 0 . Also, each channel that is formed from each of Alice's antennas towards Bob's and Eve's antennas is characterized by an SNR value, as shown in (24) . Therefore, for each of these channels we can calculate the sets of good bits G n (W ABj , β) and G n (W AEj , β).
In this scenario, we select one of Alice's antennas, indexed as i main and which we will refer to as the main antenna, to transmit the first block of information for which Type A coding was used. The rest of the information blocks are transmitted by the rest of the antennas with Type B coding. The main antenna is selected by using Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 Main Antenna Selection with Weak Security
N s ← Number of antennas used by each terminal
Algorithm 1 returns Alice's antenna that maximizes the number of information bits that can be securely transmitted. This antenna will be used in order to transmit the information block V Aj main , which will also be used as a cryptographic key. This way, we select the antenna for which the Alice-Eve channel is most degraded compared to the Alice-Bob channel, while maximizing the length of the key. For the antenna with j = j main , Type A coding with P A n (V Aj main , W ABjmain , W AEjmain ) is used, where
i.e., P 1,jmain+1 = 1 in the antenna mapping matrix. For the antennas with j ∈ Z Ns−1 0 − j main the length |V Aj | is selected so that the code is capacity achieving for that channel, i.e.,
Based on (47), we define the total length of the information to be transmitted through all the antennas except i main as
− j main . In the following, we will examine the coding scheme that will be used for these channels. We examine two cases depending on the achievable length of the cryptographic key, given by (46), compared to the length of the information to be transmitted through the rest of the channels, given by (48).
|V Aj main | ≥ l: If the total length of the information will be less than or equal to the total length of the key, we can use a one-time pad, as stated in Section IV-C. Also, we define V l Aj main as a vector that consists of the first l elements of V Aj main . We split V l Aj main into blocks
where each block corresponds to each Alice's antenna except j main , and each block has length equal to the corresponding information block V Aj , i.e., |v j | = |V Aj |. In this case, for each of the antennas with j ∈ S C jmain , we perform Type B coding P B n ({V Aj } vj , W ABj ), where the encryption method is the one-time pad for each antenna, since the length of each information block and the corresponding key length are equal. In this case, the result of Proposition 1 applies directly and the weak security condition can be proven for each channel, if we consider the channels that correspond to the j main from Bob to Eve, and the channels that correspond to any other antenna j = j main from Bob to Eve. This is possible because, as described in Section III, the system is designed in order to eliminate interference between the selected channels, and each of the other channels except j main uses Type B coding with V Aj main as the cryptographic key.
|V Ai main | < l: If the total length of the information will be greater than the total length of the key, we will use the encryption method presented in Section IV-C. We will use a CSPRNG to produce a sequence X, such that |X| = l, as defined in (48). Next, we split X into blocks
where again |x j | = |V Aj |. Then, for each of the antennas with j ∈ S C jmain , we perform Type B coding P B n ({V Aj } xj , W ABj ), where a bitwise XOR operation between V Aj and x j is used.
The security provided by this method will be dependent on the CSPRNG used, as described in Section IV-C. The block length that should be selected depends on the level of security that we want to achieve. There have been various suggestions about the ideal key length according to the desired security level [35] .
From (46) and (47) it follows that the length of the information block V A which will be transmitted in a single time slot will be
Note here that if the algorithm returns j main = −1, no applicable channel was found, meaning that each of the AliceBob channels was degraded compared to the corresponding Alice-Eve channel. In this case, so that the transmitter doesn't remain silent, we can perform Type B coding on each antenna by using the CSPRNG on the cryptographic key that was transmitted in the previous time slot, to generate a sequence of the required length for all antennas. Then, the encryption method proposed in Section IV-C can be used, and a new key will be generated in the next time slot where i main = −1. This is done in order to renew the key as frequently as possible.
The proposed transmission strategy for the weak security scheme is summarized in the flowchart of Fig. 6 , where all the steps that are taken for the transmission of an information block are shown. As shown in Fig. 6 , when using a key from a previous time slot, it checks whether it refers to a key that was used with the CSPRNG method presented in Section IV-C or not. This is important because, if we reuse a key that has been used with the one-time pad method, this encryption method is no longer invalid. This is attributed to the fact that encrypting different information with the same key provides information to the eavesdropper in the one-time pad method that compromises the secrecy provided by this method [31] .
V. STRONG SECURITY CODING SCHEME
A. Proof of the Strong Security Condition
In this section, we describe the proposed strong security coding scheme. Initially, we consider a similar set-up to the one considered in the beginning of Section IV, where Alice has two antennas with indices j ∈ {0, 1}, and Bob and Eve each have one antenna. The Alice-Bob channels are denoted by W 0 and W 1 , and the Alice-Eve channels are denoted by W The difference in this case is that for antenna j = 0, Type C coding with P C n (V A0 , W 0 , W ′ 0 ) is used instead of Type A. As it has been proven in [14] , when this type of coding is used, the strong security condition for this channel is satisfied, meaning that
Get number of bits from information stream as shown by (51) Split bits among channels as in (47) where Z denotes Eve's observations. Again, no assumptions are made about the Alice-Eve channel for the antenna with j = 1. In this case, it is not possible to prove the reliability condition for antenna j = 0, so it also cannot be proven for antenna j = 1. However, it is possible to prove the strong security condition for the channel that corresponds to antenna j = 1.
Proposition 2. In the system described in Section IV-A, when
Type C coding is used for the channel j = 0, Type B coding is used for the channel j = 1, the strong security condition will be valid for this channel, i.e.,
Proof: Again, we assume that the length of the key V A0 is equal to the length of the message V A1 , |V A0 | = |V A1 | and the encryption method used for the channel j = 1 is the one-time pad. Equations (39) to (43) from the proof of the Proposition 1 also apply here, since they do not depend on the coding scheme used in the channel j = 0. Therefore, as in (43), we prove that
and, since the strong security condition is valid for the channel i = 0, (54) yields
Therefore, the strong security condition is proven for the channel j = 1.
As before, this can be extended to the case where |V A0 | ≥ |V A1 |, if we truncate V A0 to the length |V A1 |. Otherwise, if |V A0 | < |V A1 |, strong secrecy can be achieved for the channel j = 0, but for the channel j = 1, we can achieve a security level that is determined as clarified in Section IV-C, depending on the CSPRNG that is used.
B. MIMO Transmission Strategy
To determine the transmission scheme we propose Algorithm 2 which, as Algorithm 1, returns the index of the main antenna, but in this case, it is designed so that the strong security condition to be valid, i.e., Type C coding is used for the transmission of the key from the main antenna instead of Type A coding. Thus, rather than the difference of good for Bob and good for Eve channels that was used in Type A coding, we use the set of good for Bob and bad for Eve channels, G n (W ABj , β)∩P n (W AEj , δ n ), in order to determine the achievable key length that can be transmitted. 
Algorithm 2 Main Antenna
Regarding the encryption schemes that can be used, everything stated in Section IV-D also applies here. Similarly to the weak security coding scheme, Proposition 2 can apply directly to this case for each of Alice's antennas, since the interference between the selected channels is eliminated as described in Section III, and each of the other channels except j main uses Type B coding with V Aj main as the cryptographic key. The only difference is that the length of the information block V Aj main that will also be used as a cryptographic key that will be transmitted through j main is
while the total length of the information that will be transmitted through a single time slot is
where S C imain = Z Ns−1 0 − i main . Also, the same apply as in Section IV-D for the cases, where we use the encryption method from Section IV-C. The proposed transmission strategy can be summarized similarly to the flowchart in Fig. 6 , if we replace the lengths of the information blocks and coding types shown with the ones that should be used in the strong security scheme.
One issue about the strong security method is that the reliability condition cannot be proven, however knowledge of the key is required in order to decrypt the information from the channels with Type B coding. As stated in [14] , even though a proof is not available, low frame error rates can be achieved practically with this coding scheme in a practical system. In order to ensure that the key has been received correctly, we can add a CRC (Cyclic Redundancy Check) module [36] to the information block transmitted from the channel j main and perform retransmission when incorrect reception is detected.
VI. SIMULATION RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
A. Simulations
In this section, we present simulation results for the secrecy outage probability, which can be defined in the proposed method as the probability that Alice is able to transmit a cryptographic key by using one of the available channels. This is also the probability that the Algorithms 1 and 2 will return j main = 1, i.e., a channel which can be used to transmit the key is not found.
In Fig. 7 , the secrecy outage probability is illustrated as a function of the difference between the average SNR at Bob, i.e.,γ B , and Eve, i.e.,γ E . Without loss of generality, we consider thatγ E = 0, so the difference will beγ =γ B −γ =γ B . Furthermore, simulations were performed for MIMO systems with N s = 2, N s = 4 and N s = 8 antennas at Alice, Bob and Eve's terminals. As a benchmark, a SISO system was simulated, shown in Fig. 7 as N s = 1. We observe that in each case, the proposed MIMO method outperforms the SISO case, since the outage probability is lower than the SISO case for all three MIMO cases. Also, as the number of antennas in the transmitter and the receiver increases, the performance of the system improves as the outage probability decreases. The reason for this improvement is because MIMO provides additional degrees of freedom.
Note that in this simulation, we considered that if there is no channel to transmit the key, we consider that this is a secrecy outage event. However, in a practical system, if an outage event occurs, it is possible to transmit information by using a previously transmitted key, as presented in Sections IV-D and V-B. 
B. Discussion
The proposed method constitutes a secure transmission scheme that employs both PHY-layer security and symmetric key encryption. With this method, as it was outlined in Section III, we use a MIMO system, where N s streams of information are transmitted through independent channels, and each of the streams is transmitted securely and encrypted via polar coding.
Another point that should be noted is the criteria for choosing between the weak and strong security coding schemes. For this purpose, we should take into consideration that while Type C coding satisfies the strong security condition, it is not possible to prove the reliability condition for this scheme, while it is possible for Type A coding [14] . While this does not necessarily mean that the strong security scheme cannot achieve low error probabilities for Bob, it means that a theoretical proof is not known.
The encryption scheme employed in the N s − 1 channels where Type B coding is used is based on a cryptographic key, but thanks to the design of the coding scheme, the key is renewed constantly. Specifically, if Algorithm 1 or Algorithm 2 (depending on whether we employ the weak or strong security scheme) returns j main = −1, then the key can be renewed. Otherwise, if j main = −1, we use the key from the previous time slot. The probability that the key will be renewed in a particular time slot is shown in Fig. 7 for various cases. Therefore, each key is only valid for limited number of blocks, and even if the eavesdropper is able to acquire one key, it will only be valid for a small portion of the transmitted information and it will be changed soon afterwards.
One question that might arise is why should we apply the proposed method rather than performing secure polar coding, i.e., Type A or Type C coding, on each individual channel. The proposed method guarantees that, if there is one available TX antenna for which the corresponding eavesdropper channel will be degraded compared to the legitimate channel, then we can use all the TX antennas to perform secure transmission, regardless of whether the degradation condition is fulfilled. If we used a secure polar coding scheme for each individual antenna, then the eavesdropper channels will have to be degraded in each case. This requirement is eliminated in the proposed hybrid coding scheme. Furthermore, the secure polar coding scheme used in Type A and Type C coding reduces the coding rate that can be achieved, since a portion of the information bits will have to be random, as clarified in Section II-C. In the proposed method, Type B coding uses the entire capacity of the Alice-Bob channel, consequently there is no rate reduction. This is attributed to the fact that we made no assumptions about the eavesdropper for the channels that use Type B coding, so we can use the entire capacity of the channel to transmit encrypted information.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have proposed a setup where both information-theoretic security and encryption techniques are used to create an efficient coding scheme for MIMO systems. The polar coding scheme can achieve both weak and strong security transmission depending on the capacity of the channels formed by each TX antenna and the legitimate RX. We have proven that the weak and strong security conditions can be proven under certain conditions, while we can use an encryption scheme for the cases where it is not possible to prove these security conditions. The proposed method uses a secure polar coding scheme to perform key exchange that is renewed with every block transmission, eliminating the need for a periodic key exchange, as it is performed organically with the transmission of information.
